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ABSTRACT  
Entrepreneurship has become a fast-growing subfield in management research, and 
is increasingly appearing in economics, finance, and even law. We survey a number 
of approaches to entrepreneurship in the economics and management literatures, 
and argue that modern research in this area need to be focused around ideas from 
Austrian economics and Frank Knight on entrepreneurial judgment. We critically 
discuss the recent opportunity discovery literature in management, and argue that it 
has partially misunderstood the Austrian origins of the theory, and fails to ade-
quately distinguish between opportunity identification and opportunity exploitation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Entrepreneurship is one of the fastest-growing subfields in management research, and is 
increasingly appearing in economics, finance, and even law. Entrepreneurship became a 
Division (specialized interest group) within the Academy of Management in 1987 and 
will soon have its own subject code in the Journal of Economic Literature classification 
scheme. Research and policy organizations such as the World Bank, the U.S. Federal 
Reserve System, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture show a growing interest study-
ing and encouraging entrepreneurship. The Kauffman Foundation has substantially in-
creased its funding for entrepreneurship research.  
Entrepreneurship is also becoming one of the most popular subjects at U.S. colleges 
and universities (Gartner and Vesper, 2001; Solomon, Duffy, and Tarabishy, 2002). En-
trepreneurship courses, programs, and activities are emerging not only in schools of 
business, but throughout the curriculum. In 2003 U.S. colleges and universities offered 
over 2,200 entrepreneurship courses at over 1,600 schools, supported by 277 endowed 
faculty positions, several dozen refereed academic journals, and more than 100 funded 
centers (Kuratko, 2003). While the field remains a minority specialization among busi-
ness school faculty (Katz, 2003), during the 1990s the number of entrepreneurship posi-
tions increased by over 250% and the number of candidates nearly doubled (Finkle and 
Deeds, 2001). Besides the usual business school offerings courses in Social Entrepre-
neurship, Family Business Management, Technical Entrepreneurship, Performing Arts 
Entrepreneurship, and the like are popping up in colleges of arts and sciences, engineer-
ing, education, social work, and even fine arts. 
Surprisingly, while the entrepreneur is fundamentally an economic agent—the 
“driving force of the market,” in Mises’s (1949, p. 249) phrase—modern economics 
 2
maintains an ambivalent relationship with entrepreneurship. It is widely recognized that 
entrepreneurship is somehow important, but there is little consensus about how the 
entrepreneurial role should be modeled and incorporated into economic theory. Indeed, 
the most important works in the economic literature on entrepreneurship—Schumpeter’s 
account of innovation, Knight’s theory of profit, and Kirzner’s analysis of entrepreneurial 
discovery—are viewed as interesting, but idiosyncratic insights that do not easily 
generalize to other contexts and problems. Because the entrepreneur in many ways 
personifies market forces, one might expect him to be the central figure in economics. 
Similarly, because most entrepreneurial ventures somehow involve a firm, entrepreneurship 
would seem to be a central subject in the economic theory of the firm.. However, one seeks 
in vain for references to the entrepreneur in the leading textbooks and research articles on 
the theory of the firm. 
Similarly, the strategic-management literature has not had a strong role for the 
entrepreneur. (Within the Academy of Management, the Entrepreneurship interest group is 
separate from the Business Policy and Strategy and Organization Theory groups.) And yet, 
entrepreneurship is ultimately the main source of value creation at the firm level. Indeed, the 
firm’s key strategic decisions—strategy formulation, market analysis, industry positioning, 
diversification, vertical integration and outsourcing, organizational design—are ultimately 
entrepreneurial decisions (Foss and Klein, 2002; Yu, 2005; Matthews, 2006) But it is only 
very recently that the strategic management field has realized the need for a closer 
relationship with entrepreneurship, resulting in the 2008 start-up of the Strategic 
Entrepreneurship Journal. The fields of organizational behavior and human-resource 
management may follow suit. 
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The absence of the entrepreneur in economics and management is largely a product of 
the historical development of economics. While classical economists such as Adam Smith 
and, particularly, Jean-Baptiste Say gave the entrepreneur a central role in their accounts of 
the market process, this is hardly characteristic of modern economics.1 The historian of 
economic thought Paul McNulty (1984: 240) notes that  
The perfection of the concept of competition . . . which was at the heart of 
the development of economics as a science during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, led on the one hand to an increasingly rigorous analyti-
cal treatment of market processes and on the other hand to an increasingly 
passive role for the firm.  
The “increasingly rigorous analytical treatment” of markets, notably in the form of gen-
eral equilibrium theory, not only made firms increasingly “passive,” it also made the 
model of the firm increasingly stylized and anonymous, doing away with those dynamic 
aspects of markets that are most closely related to entrepreneurship (O’Brien 1984). In 
particular, the development of what came to be known as the “production function view” 
(Williamson, 1985; Langlois and Foss 1999)—roughly, the firm as it is presented in in-
termediate microeconomics textbooks with its fully transparent production possibility 
sets—was a deathblow to the theory of entrepreneurship in the context of firm organiza-
tion. If any firm can do what any other firm does (Demsetz 1991), if all firms are always 
on their production possibility frontier, and if firms always make their equilibrium 
choices of input combinations and output levels, then there is no room for entrepreneur-
ship. Even in more advanced models of asymmetric production functions, hidden charac-
teristics, and strategic interaction, firms or agents are modeled as behaving according to 
                                                 
1 As Machovec (1995: 109) notes, to the classical economists “specialization and commercial freedom 
spawned opportunities for alert individuals.”  Unlike later economists, the classical economists held what is 
essentially a process view in which competition was seen “as a tapestry of aggressive commercial behav-
iors which created pure profits by speculating on price futures, engineering new methods of production, 
and inspiring new product lines to better serve consumers” (ibid.: 136).    
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fixed rules subject to formalization by the analyst. The entrepreneur makes an occasional 
appearance in business history and in Schumpeterian models of innovation and technical 
change, but is largely absent from contemporary economic theory. 
Given this historical development, it is not surprising that much of the important 
work on the economics of entrepreneurship was done prior to this period (e.g., Schum-
peter, 1911), and that more recent work by economists on entrepreneurship has been 
done largely outside of the confines of mainstream economics (e.g., Kirzner, 1973, 1979, 
1985). There have been some attempts to incorporate aspects of entrepreneurship into 
traditional models—via equilibrium models of the self-employment decision (Kihlstrom 
and Laffont, 1979; Lazear, 2004), the choice of new-venture creatiopn (Holmes and 
Schmitz, 2001), or the R&D investment decision (Aghion and Howitt, 1992).2 But these 
models treat entrepreneurship in a highly stylized and abstract fashion, not clearly distin-
guishing entrepreneurship from “management” or other economic functions. 
Moreover, large parts of strategic management (especially the “UCLA” version of the 
resource-based view of the firm (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982; Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 
1993) are based on the neoclassical competitive model and on the production-function 
view of the firm (if perhaps patched up in various ways) (Foss, 2003). Penrose’s (1959) 
approach to firm capabilities and firm growth, by contrast, shares more with Austrian and 
evolutionary concepts of the firm and market than with neoclassical economics (Foss, 
Klein, Kor, and Mahoney, 2008), though the “real” Penrosian model, rather than the re-
source-based interpretation of Penrose (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993), remains in the mi-
                                                 
2 See Bianchi and Henrekson (2005) for a review of attempts to incorporate entrepreneurship into neoclas-
sical models. 
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nority within mainstream strategic management.3 It is thus not surprising that it has been 
difficult to define a role for the entrepreneur in strategic management theory.  
By contrast, the Austrian school of economics has always given the entrepreneur a 
central role in the economy, going back at least to the proto-Austrian contribution of 
Richard Cantillon (1755).4 For this reason, one would expect Austrian economics to fig-
ure prominently in the modern entrepreneurship literature. However, this is not the case. 
While Kirzner’s concept of “alertness” is frequently invoked in particular strands of the 
entrepreneurship literature, particularly in management (e.g., Shane, 2003) this literature 
tends to misunderstand fundamentally the nature and purpose of Kirzner’s metaphor of 
entrepreneurial discovery. Moreover, the overall causal-realist account of the market 
process that characterizes the Austrian approach has had little impact on contemporary 
entrepreneurship scholarship, which takes its underlying economic framework from the 
neoclassical account of production and exchange.  
We argue that Austrian economics provides a natural foundation for entrepreneurship 
research, but not through the well-known Austrian concepts of distributed, tacit knowl-
edge and entrepreneurial discovery. Rather, we maintain that entrepreneurship can be 
more thoroughly grounded, and more closely linked to the economic theory of the firm 
and the strategic-management literature, by adopting the Cantillon-Knight-Mises under-
standing of entrepreneurship as judgment, along with the Austrian’s subjectivist account 
of capital heterogeneity. Our overall approach below is to ask if, and how, the entrepre-
neur needs a firm. The answers are not obvious. Some approaches to entrepreneurship—
Schumpeter’s concept of the entrepreneur as innovator, for instance—treat the entrepre-
                                                 
3 On the differences between Penrose and mainstream strategy thinking, see Foss (2000). 
4 On Cantillon’s place in the Austrian tradition see the Fall 1985 issue of the Journal of Libertarian Studies 
along with Hayek (1931), Rothbard (1995, chapter 12), and Thornton (1998). 
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neur as an uncaused cause, a pure genius who operates outside the usual constraints im-
posed by resource owners and other market participants and is thus unaffected by the 
firm. Other approaches treat entrepreneurs as skilled managers, exercising their entrepre-
neurial talents through skillful arrangements of productive factors, thus being an integral 
part of the firm’s operation.5 We also critically discuss new developments in the entre-
preneurship field in management, notably the tendency to identify entrepreneurship with 
opportunity discovery, arguing that this literature misinterprets Kirzner’s instrumental 
use of the discovery metaphor and mistakenly makes “opportunities” the unit of analysis. 
Instead, we propose an alternative approach in which investment is the unit of analysis 
and link this approach to Austrian capital theory.  
CONCEPTS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND THE FIRM 
Entrepreneurship: Occupational, Structural, and Functional perspectives 
The remainder of this chapter reviews the economics and management literatures on 
entrepreneurship, critiques the dominant “opportunity-discovery” approach, and outlines 
a new synthesis of entrepreneurship and theory of the firm. We begin by organizing the 
various strands of entrepreneurship literature, distinguishing among occupational, struc-
tural, and functional perspectives. 
Occupational theories define entrepreneurship as self- employment and treat the in-
dividual as the unit of analysis, describing the characteristics of individuals who start 
their own businesses and explaining the choice between employment and self-
employment (Kihlstrom and Laffont, 1979; Shaver and Scott, 1991; Parker, 2004). The 
labor economics literature on occupational choice, along with psychological literature on 
                                                 
5 On the history of the entrepreneurship concept in economic theory, see Elkjaer (1991) and Ibrahim and 
Vyakarnam (2003). 
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the personal characteristics of self-employed individuals, fits in this category. For exam-
ple, McGrath and MacMillan (2000) argue that particular individuals have an “entrepre-
neurial mindset” that enables and encourages them to find opportunities overlooked or 
ignored by others (and that this mindset is developed through experience, rather than 
formal instruction). 
Structural approaches treat the firm or industry as the unit of analysis, defining the 
“entrepreneurial firm” as a new or small firm. The literatures on industry dynamics, firm 
growth, clusters, and networks have in mind a structural concept of entrepreneurship 
(Aldrich, 1990; Acs and Audretsch, 1990; Audretsch, Keilbach, and Lehmann, 2005). 
Indeed, the idea that one firm, industry, or economy can be more “entrepreneurial” than 
another suggests that entrepreneurship is associated with a particular market structure 
(i.e., lots of small or young firms). 
By contrast, the classic contributions to the economic theory of entrepreneurship 
from Schumpeter, Knight, Mises, Kirzner, and others model entrepreneurship as a func-
tion, activity, or process, not an employment category or market structure. The entrepre-
neurial function has been characterized in various ways: judgment (Cantillon, 1755; 
Knight, 1921; Casson, 1982; Langlois and Cosgel, 1993; Foss and Klein, 2005), innova-
tion (Schumpeter, 1911), adaptation (Schultz, 1975, 1982), or alertness (Kirzner, 1973, 
1979, 1992). In each case, these functional concepts of entrepreneurship are largely inde-
pendent of occupational and structural concepts. The entrepreneurial function can be 
manifested in large and small firms, in old and new firms, by individuals or teams, across 
a variety of occupational categories, and so on. By focusing too narrowly on self-
employment and start-up companies, the contemporary literature may be understating the 
role of entrepreneurship in the economy and in business organization. 
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What is the entrepreneurial function? Consider these possibilities: management; 
imagination or creativity; innovation; alertness; the ability to adjust; charismatic leader-
ship; and judgment. 
Entrepreneurship as Management 
In the entrepreneurship curriculum of many business schools, the phenomenon under 
investigation has often been “small-business management.”6 Entrepreneurs are pictured 
as the managers of small, family-owned businesses or start-up companies. Entrepreneur-
ship consists of routine management tasks, relationships with venture capitalists and 
other sources of external finance, product development, marketing, and so on. In this 
sense, entrepreneurship and the theory of the firm — the theory of some firms, at least — 
are inextricably linked. The theory of entrepreneurship in this approach is the theory of 
how small business owners organize and manage their assets.  
Unfortunately, this notion of entrepreneurship is sufficiently elastic to be practically 
meaningless. It appears to include virtually all aspects of small or new business manage-
ment, while excluding the identical tasks when performed within a large or established 
business. Put differently, if entrepreneurship is simply a set of management activities, or 
any management activity that takes place with in a particular type of firm, then it is un-
clear why we should bother to add this label to those activities.  
Entrepreneurship as Imagination or Creativity 
 It is common, particularly within the management literature, to associate entrepre-
neurship with boldness, daring, imagination, or creativity (Begley and Boyd, 1987; 
                                                 
6  However, this appears to be slowly changing towards a more generic and theoretically based understand-
ing of entrepreneurship.  
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Chandler and Jansen, 1992; Aldrich and Wiedenmayer, 1993; Hood and Young, 1993; 
Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). These accounts emphasize the personal, psychological charac-
teristics of the entrepreneur. Entrepreneurship, in this conception, is not a necessary 
component of all human decision-making, but a specialized activity that some individuals 
are particularly well equipped to perform.7
If these characteristics are the essence of entrepreneurship, then entrepreneurship has 
no obvious link to the theory of the firm (or, at least not without further arguments). The 
relevant personal characteristics can presumably be acquired by contract on the market 
by purchasing consulting services, project management, and the like. A “non-
entrepreneurial” owner or manager, in other words, can manage the day-to-day opera-
tions of the firm, purchasing “entrepreneurship” on the market as needed. Moreover, the 
literature does not explain clearly whether imagination and creativity are necessary, suf-
ficient, or incidental conditions for entrepreneurship. Clearly the founders of many firms 
are imaginative and creative. If not, are they not entrepreneurs? 
Entrepreneurship as Innovation 
Probably the best-known concept of entrepreneurship in economics is Joseph Schum-
peter’s idea of the entrepreneur as innovator. Schumpeter’s entrepreneur introduces “new 
combinations”—new products, production methods, markets, sources of supply, or in-
dustrial combinations—shaking the economy out of its previous equilibrium through a 
process Schumpeter termed “creative destruction.” The entrepreneur-innovator is intro-
duced in Schumpeter’s ground-breaking Theory of Economic Development (1911) and 
                                                 
7 As Gartner (1988: 21) argues, however, this literature employs a host of different (and frequently) contra-
dictory notions of entrepreneurship. A “startling number of traits and characteristics have been attributed to 
the entrepreneur, and a ‘psychological profile’ of the entrepreneur assembled from these studies would 
portray someone larger than life, full of contradictions, and, conversely, someone so full of traits that (s)he 
would have to be a sort of generic ‘Everyman.’” 
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developed further in his two-volume work, Business Cycles (1939). Realizing that the 
entrepreneur has no place in the general-equilibrium system of Walras, whom Schum-
peter greatly admired, Schumpeter gave the entrepreneur a role as the source of economic 
change:8  
[I]n capitalist reality as distinguished from its textbook picture, it is not 
[price] competition which counts but the competition from the new com-
modity, the new technology, the new source of supply, the new type of 
organization . . . competition which commands a decisive cost or quality 
advantage and which strikes not at the margins of profits and the outputs 
of existing firms but at their foundations and their very lives (Schumpeter, 
1942, p. 84). 
While there is a substantial body of “Schumpeterian” literature, especially in technol-
ogy management and evolutionary economics, the extent to which this work builds di-
rectly on Schumpeter’s ideas is subject to debate. Most of the modern literature attempts 
to model small, continuous changes, while Schumpeter sought to explain radical, discon-
tinuous shifts in technologies and markets. Schumpeter also paid little attention to natural 
selection, taking the successful innovation as the unit of analysis. As Rosenberg (p. 197) 
remarks, “many of Schumpeter’s contributions to economic and social thought remain 
neglected—even by people who would not shrink from the label ‘Neo–Schumpeterians.’” 
Schumpeter carefully distinguished the entrepreneur from the capitalist (and strongly 
criticized the neoclassical economists for confusing the two). His entrepreneur need not 
own capital, or even work within the confines of a business firm at all. While the entre-
preneur could be a manager or owner of a firm, he is more likely to be an independent 
contractor or craftsman. In Schumpeter’s conception, “… people act as entrepreneurs 
only when they actually carry out new combinations, and lose the character of entrepre-
neurs as soon as they have built up their business, after which they settle down to running 
                                                 
8 This could include, but is not limited to, the formation of new business ventures.  
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it as other people run their businesses” (Ekelund and Hébert, 1990: 569). Moreover, be-
cause Schumpeterian entrepreneurship is sui generis, independent of its environment, the 
nature and structure of the firm does not affect the level of entrepreneurship. Corporate 
R&D budgets, along with organizational structures that encourage managerial commit-
ment to innovation (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1994), have little to do with Schumpeterian en-
trepreneurship per se. 
This suggests a rather tenuous relationship between the entrepreneur and the firm he 
owns, works for, or contracts with. Entrepreneurship is exercised within the firm when it 
introduces new products, processes, or strategies, but not otherwise. The day-to-day op-
erations of the firm need not involve entrepreneurship at all. Moreover, because Schum-
peterian entrepreneurship is sui generis, independent of its environment, the nature and 
structure of the firm does not affect the level of entrepreneurship. Corporate R&D budg-
ets, along with organizational structures that encourage managerial commitment to inno-
vation (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1994), have little to do with Schumpeterian entrepreneurship 
per se.9  
Entrepreneurship as Alertness  
 Entrepreneurship can also be conceived as “alertness” to profit opportunities. While 
present in Cantillon’s and J. B. Clark’s notions of entrepreneurship, this concept has been 
elaborated most fully by Israel Kirzner (1973, 1979, 1992) Kirzner’s formulation empha-
sizes the nature of competition as a discovery process: the source of entrepreneurial profit 
is superior foresight—the discovery of something (new products, cost-saving technology) 
unknown to other market participants. The simplest case is that of the arbitrageur, who 
                                                 
9 Other writers influenced by Schumpeter, however, such as Baumol (1993a), do view public and private 
R&D, the scale and scope of patent protection, and basic science education as important determinants of 
the level of entrepreneurial activity.  
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discovers a discrepancy in present prices that can be exploited for financial gain. In a 
more typical case, the entrepreneur is alert to a new product or a superior production 
process and steps in to fill this market gap before others. Success, in this view, comes not 
from following a well-specified maximization problem, but from having some knowl-
edge or insight that no one else has—that is, from something beyond the given means-
end framework.10
Kirzner’s entrepreneurs do not own capital; they need only be alert to profit opportu-
nities. Because they own no assets, they bear no uncertainty. Critics have seized on this 
point as a defect in Kirzner’s conception. According to this criticism, mere alertness to a 
profit opportunity is not sufficient for earning profits. To reap financial gain, the entre-
preneur must invest resources to realize the discovered profit opportunity. “Entrepreneu-
rial ideas without money are mere parlor games until the money is obtained and commit-
ted to the projects” (Rothbard, 1985: 283). Moreover, excepting the few cases where 
buying low and selling high are nearly instantaneous (say, electronic trading of curren-
cies or commodity futures), even arbitrage transactions require some time to complete. 
The selling price may fall before the arbitrageur has made his sale, and thus even the pure 
arbitrageur faces some probability of loss. In Kirzner’s formulation, the worst that can 
happen to an entrepreneur is the failure to discover an existing profit opportunity. Entre-
preneurs either earn profits or break even, but it is unclear how they suffer losses. 
For these reasons, the connection between Kirznerian entrepreneurship and the theory 
of the firm is uncertain. Owners, managers, employees, and independent contractors can 
                                                 
10 It is important to distinguish Kirzner’s view of superior foresight from Stigler’s search model in which 
the value of new knowledge is known in advance, available to anyone willing to pay the relevant search 
costs. “Stigler's searcher decides how much time it is worth spending rummaging through dusty attics and 
untidy drawers looking for a sketch which (the family recalls) Aunt Enid thought might be by Lautrec.  
Kirzner’s entrepreneur enters a house and glances lazily at the pictures which have been hanging in the 
same place for years. ‘Isn't that a Lautrec on the wall?’” (Ricketts, 1987: 58). 
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all be alert to new profit opportunities. Kirzner’s entrepreneur does not need a firm to 
exercise his function in the economy. For these reasons, the link between Kirznerian en-
trepreneurship and other branches of economic analysis, such as industrial organization, 
innovation, and the theory of the firm, is weak. Hence Kirzner’s concept has not gener-
ated a large body of applications.11
Entrepreneurship as the Ability to Adjust 
Schultz (1975, 1979, 1982), like Schumpeter, works in the Walrasian tradition. How-
ever, unlike Walras and Schumpeter, Schultz recognizes that markets do not automati-
cally and instantaneously regain equilibrium following an exogenous shock. 
“[R]egaining equilibrium takes time, and how people proceed over time depends on their 
efficiency in responding to any given disequilibrium and on the costs and returns of the 
sequence of adjustments available to them” (Schultz 1975, p. 829). Surprisingly, econo-
mists have devoted little attention to this problem. Even Schumpeter, who saw economic 
progress as the result of disruptions to existing equilibrium states, assumed that equilib-
rium is quickly regained following such a disruption. Schultz, by contrast, took innova-
tion as given, and focused how economic agents adjust to exogenous shocks. An example 
is farmers in a developing economy. Such people must “deal with a sequence of changes 
in economic conditions, which are in general not of their own making because they origi-
nate mainly out of the activities of people other than farm people. For this reason Schum-
peter’s theory of economic development is far from sufficient to explain most of these 
changes” (Schultz 1975, p. 832). Moreover, the atomistic nature of agriculture and the 
unique aspects of farm production generate problems of collective action and by–product 
behavior (Olson, 1965), making such adjustments lengthier. 
                                                 
11 Exceptions include Ekelund and Saurman (1988), Holcombe (1992), Harper (1995), and Sautet (2001). 
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In Schultz’s formulation, entrepreneurship is the ability to adjust, or reallocate one’s 
resources, in response to changing circumstances. As such, entrepreneurship is an aspect 
of all human behavior, not a unique function performed by a class of specialists. “No 
matter what part of the economy is being investigated, we observe that people are con-
sciously reallocating their resources in response to changes in economic conditions” 
(Schultz 1979:2). Businessmen, farmers, housewives, students, and even university 
presidents, deans, and research directors make Schultz’s (1979) list of entrepreneurs.  
Somewhat paradoxically, the degree to which entrepreneurship is manifested in a so-
ciety is itself determined by supply and demand. The demand for entrepreneurial services 
is given by the expected gains from adjusting one’s resources in the face of the disequi-
librium, itself a function of some characteristics of that disequilibrium. The supply of 
entrepreneurial capacities is given by agents’ abilities to perceive and exploit opportuni-
ties. Like any economic good, entrepreneurship is valuable and scarce (Schultz 1979, p. 
6). Knight and Kirzner treat entrepreneurship as “extra–economic,” meaning that it is the 
driving force behind the pricing process, but is not itself traded and priced on the market. 
Schultz (1979) insists that entrepreneurial ability, like other services available for hire, is 
a resource with a market price and quantity, though he did not develop this insight into a 
fully specified theory of the supply of and demand for entrepreneurship. 
Schultz conceives entrepreneurial ability as a form of human capital. Like other 
forms of human capital, this ability can be increased through education, training, experi-
ence, health care, and so on. While education and other human–capital investments also 
lead to improvements in technical and allocative efficiency, Schultz argues that effi-
ciency improvements cannot account for all of the effects of education on economic per-
formance, particularly in agricultural communities during periods of modernization. At 
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least part of the returns to education are the returns to improved abilities to adjust to 
change, for instance by adopting new technology and organizational practices. Moreover, 
an economy’s aggregate stock of entrepreneurial ability can also be increased by the im-
migration of people with particular entrepreneurial experiences and skills (presumably in 
response to increased opportunities for entrepreneurial gain). 
Entrepreneurship as Charismatic Leadership 
 Another strand of literature, incorporating insights from economics, psychology, and 
sociology and leaning heavily on Max Weber, associates entrepreneurship with charis-
matic leadership. Entrepreneurs, in this view, specialize in communication —the ability 
to articulate a plan, a set of rules, or a broader vision, and impose it on others. Casson 
(2000) calls these plans “mental models” of reality. The successful entrepreneur excels at 
communicating these models to others, who come to share the entrepreneur’s vision (and 
become his followers). Such entrepreneurs are also typically optimistic, self-confident, 
and enthusiastic (though it is not clear whether these are necessary conditions). 
Witt (1998a, 1998b) describes entrepreneurship similarly as “cognitive leadership.” 
He outlines an entrepreneurial theory of the firm that combines recent literature on cogni-
tive psychology with Kirzner’s concept of alertness. Entrepreneurs require complemen-
tary factors of production, he argues, which are coordinated within the firm. For the firm 
to be successful, the entrepreneur must establish a tacit, shared framework of goals, 
which governs the relationships among members of the entrepreneur’s team. As Langlois 
(1998) points out, it is often easier (less costly) for individuals to commit to a specific 
individual, the leader, rather than an abstract set of complex rules governing the firm’s 
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operations. The appropriate exercise of charismatic authority, then, reduces coordination 
costs within organizations. 
A possible weakness of this approach, in our view, is its emphasis on human assets, 
rather than the inalienable physical assets the entrepreneur controls. Must the charismatic 
leader necessarily own physical capital, or can he be an employee or independent con-
tractor? Formulating a business plan, communicating a “corporate culture,” and the like 
are clearly important dimensions of business leadership. But are they attributes of the 
successful manager or the successful entrepreneur? Even if top-level managerial skill 
were the same as entrepreneurship, it is unclear why charismatic leadership should be 
regarded as more “entrepreneurial” than other, comparatively mundane managerial tasks 
such as structuring incentives, limiting opportunism, administering rewards, and so on. 
Entrepreneurship as Judgment 
An alternative to the foregoing accounts is that entrepreneurship consists of judg-
mental decision-making under conditions of uncertainty. Judgment refers primarily to 
business decision-making when the range of possible future outcomes, let alone the likeli-
hood of individual outcomes, is generally unknown (what Knight [1921] terms uncertainty, 
rather than mere probabilistic risk). This view finds expression in the earliest known dis-
cussion of entrepreneurship, that found in Richard Cantillon’s Essai sur la nature de 
commerce en géneral (1755). Cantillon argues that all market participants, with the ex-
ception of landowners and the nobility, can be classified as either entrepreneurs or wage 
earners:  
Entrepreneurs work for uncertain wages, so to speak, and all others for 
certain wages until they have them, although their functions and their rank 
are very disproportionate. The General who has a salary, the Courtier who 
has a pension, and the Domestic who has wages, are in the latter class. All 
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the others are Entrepreneurs, whether they establish themselves with a 
capital to carry on their enterprise, or are Entrepreneurs of their own work 
without any capital, and they may be considered as living subject to uncer-
tainty; even Beggars and Robbers are Entrepreneurs of this class (Cantil-
lon, 1755: 54). 
Bearing risk—that is, making decisions under conditions of uncertainty—is the entrepre-
neur’s raison d’être. 
Judgment is distinct from boldness, innovation, alertness, and leadership. Judgment 
must be exercised in mundane circumstances, for ongoing operations as well as new ven-
tures. While alertness tends to be passive (perhaps even hard to distinguish from luck, 
Demsetz 1983), judgment is active. Alertness is the ability to react to existing opportuni-
ties while judgment refers to the creation of new opportunities.12 Entrepreneurs “are those 
who seek to profit by actively promoting adjustment to change. They are not content to 
passively adjust their . . . activities to readily foreseeable changes or changes that have 
already occurred in their circumstances; rather, they regard change itself as an opportu-
nity to meliorate their own conditions and aggressively attempt to anticipate and exploit 
it” (Salerno, 1993: 123). Those who specialize in judgmental decision-making may be 
dynamic, charismatic leaders, but they need not possess these traits. Decision making 
under uncertainty is entrepreneurial, whether it involves imagination, creativity, leader-
ship, and related factors or not. 13
                                                 
12 In Kirzner’s treatment, entrepreneurship is characterized as “a responding agency. I view the entrepre-
neur not as a source of innovative ideas ex nihilo, but as being alert to the opportunities that exist already 
and are waiting to be noticed” (Kirzner, 1973, p. 74). 
13 In Mises’s (1949) formulation, entrepreneurship is introduced to explain the existence of profit and loss. 
In the marginal productivity theory of distribution, laborers earn wages, capitalists earn interest, and own-
ers of specific factors earn rents. Any excess (deficit) of a firm’s realized receipts over these factor pay-
ments constitutes profit (loss). Profit and loss, therefore, are returns to entrepreneurship. In a hypothetical 
equilibrium without uncertainty (what Mises calls the “evenly rotating economy”), capitalists would still 
earn interest, as a reward for lending, but there would be no profit or loss. 
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Knight introduces judgment to link profit and the firm to uncertainty. Entrepreneur-
ship represents judgment that cannot be assessed in terms of its marginal product and 
which cannot, accordingly, be paid a wage (Knight, 1921: p. 311). In other words, there 
is no market for the judgment that entrepreneurs rely on, and therefore exercising judg-
ment requires the person with judgment to start a firm. Judgment thus implies asset own-
ership, for judgmental decision making is ultimately decision making about the employ-
ment of resources. An entrepreneur without capital goods is, in Knight’s sense, no entre-
preneur (Foss and Klein, 2005). 
Entrepreneurship as uncertainty bearing is also important for Mises’s theory of profit 
and loss, a cornerstone of his well–known critique of economic planning under socialism. 
Mises begins with the marginal productivity theory of distribution developed by his Aus-
trian predecessors. In the marginal productivity theory, laborers earn wages, capitalists 
earn interest, and owners of specific factors earn rents. Any excess (deficit) of a firm’s 
realized receipts over these factor payments constitutes profit (loss). Profit and loss, 
therefore, are returns to entrepreneurship. In a hypothetical equilibrium without uncer-
tainty (what Mises calls the “evenly rotating economy”), capitalists would still earn inter-
est, as a reward for lending, but there would be no profit or loss. 
Entrepreneurs, in Mises’s understanding of the market, make their production plans 
based on the current prices of factors of production and the anticipated future prices of 
consumer goods. What Mises calls “economic calculation” is the comparison of these 
anticipated future receipts with present outlays, all expressed in common monetary units. 
Under socialism, the absence of factor markets, and the consequent lack of factor prices, 
renders economic calculation—and hence rational economic planning—impossible. 
Mises’s point is that a socialist economy may employ workers, managers, technicians, 
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inventors, and the like, but it cannot, by definition, employ entrepreneurs, because there 
are no money profits and losses. Entrepreneurship, and not labor or management or tech-
nological expertise, is the crucial element of the market economy. As Mises puts it: man-
agers of socialist enterprises may be allowed to “play market,” to act as if they were 
managers of private firms with their own interests at stake, but entrepreneurs cannot be 
asked to “play speculation and investment” (Mises, 1949, p. 705). Absent entrepreneur-
ship a complex, dynamic economy cannot allocate resources to their highest valued use.14
Entrepreneurial Judgment as a Natural Complement to the Theory of the Firm 
While the view of entrepreneurship as judgment appears in many writers, it is most 
often associated with Knight (1921). For Knight, firm organization, profit, and the entre-
preneur are closely related. In his view, these arise as an embodiment, a result, and a 
cause, respectively, of commercial experimentation (Demsetz, 1988).15  
Knight introduces the notion of judgment to link profit and the firm to the existence of 
uncertainty. Judgment primarily refers to the process of businessmen forming estimates of 
future events in situations in which there is no agreement or idea at all on probabilities of 
occurrence. It may be defined as a service that enhances the quality of decisions in novel 
situations that require an urgent decision, a service that is learned and has a large tacit com-
                                                 
14 Mises and Kirzner are usually treated together as offering a unified Austrian account of the entrepreneur. 
Indeed, Kirzner, a leading member of the modern Austrian school, received his Ph.D. under Mises at New 
York University and has described his work as the working out of various parts of Mises’s system. How-
ever, we see Mises in the Cantillon-Knight tradition of viewing entrepreneurship as judgment over the 
deployment of resources, not alertness per se. Kirzner (1973: 39-40) agrees that in a world of uncertainty, 
resource owners exercise entrepreneurial judgment in allocating their resources to particular uses. But he 
goes on (1973: 40-43) to introduce the analytical device of “pure entrepreneurship,” the act of discovery or 
alertness to profit opportunities by those with no resources under their control, and claims that this func-
tion, rather than uncertainty-bearing, is the “driving force” behind the market economy. We do not find the 
concept of pure entrepreneurship or the “alertness” metaphor useful to understanding the nature of the 
market system. For more on this see Klein (1999: 24-25). 
15 Knight explains that “[w]ith uncertainty entirely absent, every individual being in possession of perfect 
knowledge, there would be no occasion for anything of the nature of responsible management or control of 
productive activities . . . Its existence in the world is a direct result of the fact of uncertainty” (1921: 267, 271).   
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ponent. Entrepreneurship represents judgment that cannot be assessed in terms of its mar-
ginal product and which cannot, accordingly, be paid a wage.16 This is because entrepre-
neurship is judgment in relation to the most uncertain events, such as starting a new firm, 
defining a new market, and the like.  
In other words, there is no market for the judgment that entrepreneurs rely on, and 
utilizing judgment therefore requires the person with judgment to start a firm. Moreover, 
judgment implies asset ownership. Judgmental decision-making is ultimately decision-
making about the employment of resources. An entrepreneur without capital goods is, in 
Knight’s sense, no entrepreneur.17 This implies an obvious link with the theory of the 
firm, particularly those (transaction cost and property rights theories) that define asset 
ownership as a crucial ingredient of firm organization (Williamson, 1996; Hart, 1995). 
The firm, in this sense, is the entrepreneur and the assets he owns, and therefore ulti-
mately controls. The theory of the firm is essentially a theory of how the entrepreneur 
exercises his judgmental decision-making—what combinations of assets will he seek to 
acquire, what (proximate) decisions will he delegate to subordinates, how will he provide 
incentives and employ monitoring to see that his assets are used consistently with his 
judgments, and so on.  
                                                 
16  “The receipt of profit in a particular case may be argued to be the result of superior judgment. But it is 
judgment of judgment, especially one's own judgment, and in an individual case there is no way of telling 
good judgment from good luck and a succession of cases sufficient to evaluate the judgment or determine 
its probable value transforms the profit into a wage. . . . If . . . capacities were known, the compensation for 
exercising them can be competitively imputed and is a wage; only, in so far as they are unknown or known 
only to the possessor himself, do they give rise to a profit” (Knight, 1921: 311). 
17 Carl Menger’s (1871) treatment of production gives the entrepreneur a similar role.  Production requires 
an “act of will” and “supervision of the execution of the production plan.” These functions “entail property 
ownership and, therefore, mark the Mengerian entrepreneur as a capitalist–entrepreneur” (Salerno, 1998: 
30). Menger describes “command of the services of capital” as a “necessary prerequisite” for economic 
activity. Even in large firms, although he may employ “several helpers,” the entrepreneur himself continues 
to bear uncertainty, perform economic calculation, and supervise production, even if these functions “are 
ultimately confined . . . to determining the allocation of portions of wealth to particular productive pur-
poses only by general categories, and to selection and control of persons” (Menger, 1871: 160–61).  
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ENTREPRENEURSHIP, OPPORTUNITY IDENTIFICATION, AND  
OPPORTUNITY EXPLOITATION 
As noted above, while Schumpeter, Kirzner, Cantillon, Knight, and Mises are frequently 
cited in the contemporary entrepreneurship literature in economics and management 
(Schultz, by contrast, is rarely cited), much of this literature takes, implicitly, an occupa-
tional or structural approach to entrepreneurship. Any relationship to the classic func-
tional contributions is inspirational, not substantive. 
The most important exception is the rapidly growing literature in management and 
organization theory on opportunity discovery or opportunity identification, or what 
Shane (2003) calls the “individual–opportunity nexus.” Opportunity identification in-
volves not only technical skills like financial analysis and market research, but also less 
tangible forms of creativity, team building, problem solving, and leadership (Long and 
McMullan, 1984; Hills, Lumpkin, and Singh, 1997; Hindle, 2004). It can involve both 
the recognition of already existing opportunities and the creation, ex nihilo, of new op-
portunities (Alvarez and Barney, 2007). While value can of course be created not only by 
starting new activities, but also by improving the operation of existing activities, research 
in opportunity identification tends to emphasize the launching of new ventures (firms, 
products, or services). As summarized by Shane (2003: 4–5):  
Entrepreneurship is an activity that involves the discovery, evaluation, and 
exploitation of opportunities to introduce new goods and services, ways of 
organizing, markets, process, and raw materials through organizing efforts 
that previously had not existed (Venkataraman, 1997; Shane and Venkata-
raman, 2000). Given this definition, the academic field of entrepreneur-
ship incorporates, in its domain, explanations for why, when and how en-
trepreneurial opportunities exist; the sources of those opportunities and 
the forms that they take; the processes of opportunity discovery and 
evaluation; the acquisition of resources for the exploitation of these oppor-
tunities; the act of opportunity exploitation; why, when, and how some in-
dividuals and not others discover, evaluate, gather resources for and ex-
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ploit opportunities; the strategies used to pursue opportunities; and the or-
ganizing efforts to exploit them (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). 
This conception makes opportunities, and their discovery and (potential) exploitation, 
the unit of analysis for entrepreneurship research. A precise definition of opportunities, 
however, has been elusive. 
Opportunities: Objective or Subjective? 
Shane and Venkataraman (2000, p. 220) define entrepreneurial opportunities as 
“those situations in which new goods, services, raw materials, and organizing methods 
can be introduced and sold at greater than their cost of production.” These opportunities 
are treated as objective phenomena, though their existence is not known to all agents. 
Shane and Venkataraman also distinguish entrepreneurial opportunities from profit op-
portunities more generally. While the latter reflect opportunities to create value by en-
hancing the efficiency of producing existing goods, services, and processes, the former 
refer to value creation through “the discovery of new means-ends frameworks.” Shane 
and Venkataraman seem to have in mind the distinction between activities that can be 
modeled as solutions to well-specified optimization problems—what Kirzner (1973) calls 
“Robbinsian maximizing”—and those for which no existing model, or decision rule, is 
available.  
However, Shane and Venkataraman appear to misunderstand Kirzner (and the Austri-
ans more generally) on this point. In a world of Knightian uncertainty, all profit opportu-
nities involve decisions for which no well-specified maximization problem is available. 
Kirzner does not mean that some economic decisions really are the result of Robbinsian 
maximizing while others reflect discovery. Instead, Kirzner is simply contrasting two 
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methodological constructions for the analysis of human action. In Knightian terms, profit 
is never the result of bearing risk, but always the result of bearing uncertainty.  
Not recognizing that Kirzner’s discovery metaphor is an instrumental construct, the 
opportunity identification literature seeks to build a positive research program by opera-
tionalizing the concept of alertness. As summarized by Gaglio and Katz (2001): 
Almost all of the initial empirical investigations of alertness have focused 
on the means by which an individual might literally “notice without 
search.” For example, Kaish and Gilad (1991) interpret this as having an 
aptitude to position oneself in the flow of information so that the probabil-
ity of encountering opportunities without a deliberate search for a specific 
opportunity is maximized. Therefore, in their operational measures of 
alertness, they asked founders to recall: (a) the amount of time and effort 
exerted in generating an information flow; (b) the selection of information 
sources for generating an information flow; and (c) the cues inherent in in-
formation that signal the presence of an opportunity. From this data the 
authors deduced: (d) the quantity of information in the flow and (e) the 
breadth and diversity of information in the flow. 
Their results conform to expectations in some ways but also reveal some 
unexpected patterns. Compared to the sample of corporate executives, the 
sample of new venture founders do appear to spend more time generating 
an information flow and do seem more likely to use unconventional 
sources of information. Interestingly, the founders do seem more attentive 
to risk cues rather than to market potential cues. However, the data also 
reveal that only inexperienced or unsuccessful founders engage in such in-
tense information collection efforts. Successful founders actually behave 
more like the sample of corporate executives. Cooper et al. (1995) found a 
similar pattern of results in their survey of 1100 firms although Busenitz 
(1996), in an altered replication of Kaish and Gilad's survey, did not. In-
deed Busenitz found few significant differences between corporate man-
agers and new venture founders. In addition, validity checks of the survey 
measures yielded low reliability scores, which led the author to conclude 
that future research in alertness required improved theoretical and opera-
tional precision. 
To an Austrian economist, however, this positive research program misses the point 
of Kirzner’s metaphor of entrepreneurial alertness: namely, that it is only a metaphor. 
Kirzner’s aim is not to characterize entrepreneurship per se, but to explain the tendency 
for markets to clear. In the Kirznerian system opportunities are (exogenous) arbitrage 
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opportunities and nothing more. Entrepreneurship itself serves a purely instrumental 
function; it is the means by which Kirzner explains market clearing. For this reason, 
Kirzner offers no theory of how opportunities come to be identified, who identifies them, 
and so on; identification itself is a black box. The claim is simply that outside the Arrow–
Debreu world in which all knowledge is effectively parameterized, opportunities for dis-
equilibrium profit exist and tend to be discovered and exploited. In short, what Kirzner 
calls “entrepreneurial discovery” is simply that which causes markets to equilibrate. 
Contemporary entrepreneurship scholars, considering whether opportunities are ob-
jective or subjective (McMullen and Shepherd, 2006; Companys and McMullen, 2007), 
note that Kirzner tends to treat them as objective. Again, this is true, but misses the point. 
Kirzner is not making an ontological claim about the nature of profit opportunities per 
se—not claiming, in other words, that opportunities are, in some fundamental sense, ob-
jective—but merely using the concept of objective, exogenously given, but not-yet-
discovered opportunities as a device for explaining the tendency of markets to clear.  
The Knightian perspective also treats entrepreneurship as an instrumental construct, 
used here to decompose business income into two constituent elements, interest and 
profit. Interest is a reward for forgoing present consumption, is determined by the relative 
time preferences of borrowers and lenders, and would exist even in a world of certainty. 
Profit, by contrast, is a reward for correctly anticipating the uncertain future (e.g., pur-
chasing factors of production at prices below the eventual selling price of the product), 
and exists only in a world of “true” uncertainty. In such a world, given that production 
takes time, entrepreneurs will earn either profits or losses based on the differences be-
tween factor prices paid and product prices received.  
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For Knight, in other words, opportunities do not exist, waiting to be discovered (and 
hence, by definition, exploited). Rather, entrepreneurs invest resources based on their 
expectations of future consumer demands and market conditions, investments that may or 
may not yield positive return. Here the focus is not on opportunities, but on investment 
and uncertainty. Expectations about the future are inherently subjective and, under condi-
tions of uncertainty rather than risk, constitute judgments that are not themselves 
modelable. Put differently, subjectivism implies that opportunities are neither “discov-
ered” nor “created” (Alvarez and Barney, 2007), but perceived. They may or may not 
exist, in an objective sense. Hence a research program based on formalizing and studying 
empirically the processes leading individuals to discover opportunities, whether based on 
economics or psychology, are misguided. Opportunities for entrepreneurial gain are thus 
inherently subjective, in the sense that they do not exist until profits are realized. 
Opportunities as a Black Box 
Confusion over the nature of opportunities is increasingly recognized. As noted by 
McMullen, Plummer, and Acs (2007: 273),  
a good portion of the research to date has focused on the discovery, ex-
ploitation, and consequences thereof without much attention to the nature 
and source of opportunity itself. Although some researchers argue that the 
subjective or socially constructed nature of opportunity makes it impossi-
ble to separate opportunity from the individual, others contend that oppor-
tunity is as an objective construct visible to or created by the knowledge-
able or attuned entrepreneur. Either way, a set of weakly held assumptions 
about the nature and sources of opportunity appear to dominate much of 
the discussion in the literature. 
Do we need a precise definition of opportunities to move forward? Can one do entre-
preneurship research without specifying what, exactly, entrepreneurial opportunities 
“are”? Can we treat opportunities as a “black box,” much as other concepts in manage-
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ment such as culture, leadership, routines, capabilities, and the like are treated (Abell, 
Felin, and Foss, 2007)? 
One approach is to focus not on what opportunities are, but what opportunities do. 
Opportunities, in this sense, are treated as a latent construct that is manifested in entre-
preneurial action—investment, creating new organizations, bringing products to market, 
and so on. A direct analogy can be drawn to the economist’s notion of preferences. Eco-
nomic theory (with the exception of behavioral economics, discussed below) takes 
agents’ preferences as given and derives implications for choice. The economist does not 
care what preferences “are,” ontologically, but simply postulates their existence and 
draws inferences about their characteristics as needed to explain particular kinds of eco-
nomic behavior. Empirically, this approach can be operationalized by treating entrepre-
neurship as a latent variable in a structural-equations framework (Xue and Klein, 2007). 
By treating opportunities as a latent construct, this approach sidesteps the problem of 
defining opportunities as objective or subjective, real or imagined, and so on. The forma-
tion of entrepreneurial beliefs is treated as a potentially interesting psychological prob-
lem, but not part of the economic analysis of entrepreneurship. It also avoids thorny 
questions about whether alertness or judgment is simply luck (Demsetz, 1983), a kind of 
intuition (Dane and Pratt, 2007), or something else entirely. 
The Unit of Analysis 
If opportunities are inherently subjective, and we treat them as a black box, then the 
unit of analysis should not be opportunities, but rather some action—in Knightian terms, 
the assembly of resources in the present in anticipation of (uncertain) receipts in the fu-
ture. Again, the analogy with preferences in microeconomic theory is clear: the unit of 
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analysis in consumer theory is not preferences but consumption. In neoclassical produc-
tion theory the unit of analysis is not the production function but some decision variable.  
One way to capture the Knightian concept of entrepreneurial action is Casson’s no-
tion of “projects” (Casson, 2007; Casson and Wadeson, 2007). A project is a stock of 
resources committed to particular activities for a specified period of time. (Opportunities 
are defined as potential, but currently inactive, projects). Focusing on projects, rather 
than opportunities, implies an emphasis not on opportunity identification, but on oppor-
tunity exploitation, not identification. More generally, this perspective suggests that en-
trepreneurship research should focus on the execution of business plans.18  
CONCLUSIONS 
This brief review of the entrepreneurship literature reveals a tremendous variety in how 
economists and management theorists have conceived the entrepreneurial function, along 
with how they have modeled the occupation of self-employment and the choice of firms 
to invest and grow. Our analysis suggests that the over-reliance on the origins and char-
acteristics of entrepreneurial opportunities may have hampered the integration of entre-
preneurship into economics and strategic management. Instead of focusing on opportuni-
ties per se, researchers might do better by treating opportunities as a latent construct that 
is manifested in entrepreneurial action, namely the exercise of judgment over the ar-
rangement of heterogeneous capital assets. The Austrian theory of capital, interpreted in 
the “attributes” framework described above, provides a useful framework for conducting 
such analysis, linking the Knightian theory of entrepreneurship and the theory of eco-
nomic organization. In short, we suggest a re-orientation of the entrepreneurship litera-
                                                 
18 See Salerno (2007) for the case that the Austrian economists, prior to Kirzner (1973), uniformly empha-
sized property ownership as inextricably linked to entrepreneurship. 
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ture toward deeds, not words or dreams. In Rothbard’s (1985, p. 283) words: “Entrepre-
neurial ideas without money are mere parlor games until the money is obtained and 
committed to the projects.” Of course, the subjectivist, Austrian concept of resources is 
inextricably tied to beliefs—vision, imagination, new mental models, if you like—but 
these beliefs are relevant only to the extent that they are manifest in action. 
One objection to this approach is to invoke recent literature in behavioral economics 
and neuro-economics. This literature takes preferences, not choices, as its unit of analy-
sis, seeking to understand the psychological basis of preference, the consistency of pref-
erences, and the like, rather than taking preferences as an irreducible primary. Likewise, 
a theory of opportunity identification could mimic the methods of behavioral economics 
and neuro-economics. This is indeed a potentially fruitful avenue for entrepreneurship 
research. However, like behavioral economics, such an approach has more in common 
with applied psychology than economics per se. It may contribute to a general, interdis-
ciplinary approach to entrepreneurship, but is not an integral part of the economic theory 
of entrepreneurship. 
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